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INTERBRANCH ACCOUNTABILITY IN
STATE GOVERNMENT AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
PETER M. SHANE*
I
INTRODUCTION
When contemporary commentators decry what they describe as growing
threats to “judicial independence,” they typically invoke “judicial independ-
ence” as a normative ideal—an institutional virtue.  That virtue is the capacity
of courts to protect individual rights, to police structural limits on governmen-
tal power, and to decide individual disputes based solely on the applicable law
and the factual records presented, without regard to intimidation or other im-
permissible influences.1  Political attacks on our courts and the politicization of
judicial selection and removal endanger that capability.
To understand what is at stake in this debate, it may be important to note
that the institutional virtue we call “judicial independence” is also a constitu-
tional requirement.  Like “separation of powers” or “checks and balances,”
“judicial independence” states a legally mandated principle of governance that
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I am deeply grateful to ABA President Philip S. Anderson and to attorney Edward W. Madeira,
Jr., chair of the ABA Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, for the oppor-
tunity to offer this paper.  The argument has been fine-tuned in light of helpful comments from my
fellow panelists at the December 1998 conference entitled Bulwarks of the Republic: Judicial Inde-
pendence and Accountability in the American System of Justice, held in Philadelphia: the Honorable
Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court; Professor Charles Geyh; the
Honorable Ernest A. Finney, Chief Justice of South Carolina; and the Honorable Abner J. Mikva,
former White House Counsel and Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  I
have benefited also from the research assistance of Andrew O’Shaughnessey.
1. “Judicial independence” is often taken to imply also “that resources exist to ensure that justice
can be dispensed fairly and efficiently; and that within reasonable limits and with appropriate account-
ability, the judiciary has the discretion to manage its own affairs.”  ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS
AND CONGRESS 112 (1997).  That is, in addition to the “decisional independence” I have described,
there is also an element of “institutional independence” that is part of the “judicial independence”
ideal.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, When Do Legislative Actions Threaten Judicial Independence? 3 (July
11, 1998) (unpublished manuscript presented to the Roscoe Pound Foundation, on file with author).
Although Professor Chemerinsky thinks the distinction relatively inconsequential, I think it helpful to
distinguish between decisional independence, which is unique to the judiciary, and aspects of institu-
tional autonomy that are implicit in any plan of coequal branches and which, therefore, are shared by
the legislative and executive branches.
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exists separately from the operational details it comprises in any of its local ver-
sions.  If this is true, then a lack of judicial capacity to protect individual rights,
to police structural limits on governmental power, and to decide individual dis-
putes impartially would, at some point, be more than a setback in realizing our
institutional ideals.  It would be a breakdown of constitutional order.  Any in-
tentional efforts by state governors or legislatures to undermine this judicial
capacity should be regarded as unconstitutional.
This position has two important implications.  First, if “judicial independ-
ence” is a legal requirement that exists apart from variable operational details,
then it may also be—and I believe it is—a legal requirement that transcends ju-
risdictions.  A significant baseline requirement of independence applies equally
to the federal system and to all state systems.  “Judicial independence” as a
general legal requirement is thus distinct from “judicial independence” as a
shorthand description for the particular sets of formal constitutional features
and concomitant legal doctrines that shape the exercise of judicial power.  Ju-
risdictions differ in their implementation of judicial power because states are
not obliged to adopt the federal government’s organizational chart or operating
instructions.  For example, state constitutions exhibit a wide variety of provi-
sions on judicial selection and removal,2 on advisory opinions,3 and on the stan-
dards for judicial impeachment.4  But none of these differences changes the ba-
sic point that a robust conception of judicial independence is a mandatory
feature for every judicial system in the United States.
                                                          
2. For a survey, current as of 1996, of the states’ judicial selection methods, see CHARLES H.
SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL
JUDGES 34-40 (1997).
3. Although the United States Supreme Court held at an early date that it lacked constitutional
authority to issue advisory opinions, see Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792), a number of state
constitutions expressly authorize an advisory opinion process.  See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(10);
ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3; MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. III, art. II.
4. For a hint of the sheer diversity among state constitutions with regard to removal standards,
consider, for example, the constitutions of Alabama,
The . . . justices of the supreme court may be removed from office for willful neglect of duty,
corruption in office, incompetency, or intemperance in the use of intoxicating liquors or nar-
cotics to such an extent, in view of the dignity of the office and importance of its duties, as un-
fits the officer for the discharge of such duties, or for any offense involving moral turpitude
while in office, or committed under color thereof, or connected therewith, by the senate sit-
ting as a court of impeachment, under oath or affirmation, on articles or charges preferred by
the house of representatives.
ALA. CONST. art. VII, § 173; Arizona, “The Governor and other State and judicial officers, except jus-
tices of courts not of record, shall be liable to impeachment for high crimes, misdemeanors, or malfea-
sance in office. . . .” ARIZ. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 2; Georgia,
Any judge may be removed, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for willful misconduct in of-
fice, or for willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of office, or for habitual intem-
perance, or for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute.
GA. CONST. art. 6, § VII(a); and Indiana,
All State officers shall, for crime, incapacity, or negligence, be liable to be removed from of-
fice, either by impeachment by the House of Representatives, to be tried by the Senate, or by
a joint resolution of the General Assembly; two-thirds of the members elected to each branch
voting, in either case, therefor.
IND. CONST. art. 6, § 7.
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The second implication relates to how states should seek to protect judicial
independence.  The relevant literature contains not only a wide variety of re-
form prescriptions for state judiciaries, but also something of a consensus that
courts, through their own behavior, ought to conduct themselves in a way that
works toward the preservation of independence.  A number of influential
commentators have specifically argued that courts ought to follow a paradigm
for institutional behavior typically called “judicial restraint” in order to protect
judicial independence.5  In brief, the argument is that courts should conduct de-
cisionmaking that is reflexively deferential to the other branches of government
and judges should be reluctant to take on policymaking roles.
I certainly agree that some form of restraint is important for the judiciary,
just as it is for both the legislative and executive branches.  After all, if a branch
is deeply committed to the utmost exercise of its powers without regard to the
consequences for governance, the government is headed for a breakdown.  As a
lodestar for judicial behavior, however, the paradigm of “judicial restraint”
may often be misleading, unhelpful, and even counterproductive.  Certainly, if
judicial independence is a constitutional requirement, then courts must be con-
cerned about adopting forms of restraint that abandon the underlying rationale
for the capacity they are seeking to protect.
A paradigm that better captures the appropriate strategy for protecting ju-
dicial independence at both state and federal levels is interbranch accountabil-
ity.  Accountability is the ideal embraced in 1997 by the American Bar Associa-
tion Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence,6 and it is
an ideal more appropriate than “restraint.”  Judicial systems may be fearless,
but also accountable, in the exercise of their powers.  The strategy of account-
ability, as I would recommend it, would seek to protect judicial independence
less by fending off those occasions when the nonjudicial branches might be-
come irritated with the courts and more by giving the nonjudicial branches af-
firmative reasons to value the judiciary positively and to bolster its capacities.
This proposition has an important corollary:  The form of judicial restraint
that is most appropriately associated with an independent judiciary is no differ-
ent from the equally important principles of legislative and executive restraint
that ought to be expected of the nonjudicial branches of state government.
Each branch has the power to make life more difficult for the others, and
probably could do so with relative impunity, legally speaking.  But each branch
should follow a rule of necessity before risking the efficacy of any other branch.
                                                          
5. See Paul D. Carrington, Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court: A Pro-
posal to Restore Vitality to State and Local Politics, 50 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998); Paul D. Car-
rington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 100 (Summer 1998) [hereinafter, Carrington, Judicial Independence]; Clifford
Taylor, The Judiciary is Too Powerful, JUDICATURE, July-Aug. 1998, at 28; see also ABA COM-
MISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY:
REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 22-
23 (1997) [hereinafter, ABA COMMISSION, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY] (quoting testimony by
Daniel Troy, Edwin Meese, Rhett Dehart, Daniel Meador, and Gerald Rosen).
6. See ABA COMMISSION, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 5, at 43.
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Just as courts should not adjudicate constitutional issues where there is no
genuine need to do so, state legislatures should not curb jurisdiction and state
governors should not propose judicial budget cuts, absent some compelling exi-
gency.  Institutional forbearance, in other words, ought be the norm for all
branches of state government.  Except as the conscientious performance of
constitutional duty compels otherwise, the branches’ common commitment to
shared governance should animate their interactions.
II
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS A UNIVERSAL CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
The intimidation or dependency of state courts can undermine the norm of
impartiality in any adjudication if judges are diverted from deciding cases based
solely on the relevant law and the facts presented.  For example, in cases based
on state separation of powers principles, the politicization of state judiciaries
can undermine judicial review by preventing state courts from effectively po-
licing the boundaries of state legislative or executive power.  In cases based on
federal law, it can undermine judicial review by preventing state courts from
fully implementing the relevant federal constitutional or statutory mandates
and prohibitions.  State courts whose independence is threatened may simply
be reluctant to uphold any valid legal claims of unpopular individuals or
groups, whether based in state or federal law.
I wish to argue, however, that litigants in state courts are constitutionally
entitled to a reasonable expectation of sufficient judicial independence to en-
sure that none of these things will occur on any systematic basis.  Sufficient ju-
dicial independence to ensure meaningful interbranch review is dictated by the
existence in every state of a written constitution based on some version of
American-style separation of powers theory.  It is also no stretch to regard such
independence as part of the constitutional guarantee to each state of a republi-
can form of government.7  Sufficient judicial independence to ensure the fully
effective implementation of federal law in state courts is mandated by the Su-
premacy Clause.8  Sufficient judicial independence to ensure that state courts
will not be bullied into the under-enforcement of constitutionally guaranteed
rights or into the improper consideration of factors outside the record in judi-
cial proceedings is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  These mandates, taken together, amount to a substantial legal
guarantee of judicial independence without regard to any other feature of any
state constitution of which I am aware.
Before explaining this position, it is worth anticipating the objection that
calling the amalgam of these guarantees a legal mandate is unhelpful because,
except in very rare instances, such a mandate would be judicially enforceable
only with great difficulty or not at all.  Skeptics may deem it academic bluster
                                                          
7. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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to call something a constitutional mandate that cannot be readily enforced
through ordinary legal processes.
However, a good deal of what is fundamental to our constitution—
especially with regard to matters of organizational structure and ethos—is not
judicially enforceable.9  Surely—a handy word to use in the absence of authori-
tative judicial pronouncements—it would be unconstitutional for the President
to establish religion by conditioning the exercise of his pardon power on
whether federal pardon applicants had or had not accepted Christ as Savior
while in prison.  It also would be unconstitutional for Congress to undermine
our system of constitutionally imposed checks and balances by willfully denying
to the executive branch all appropriations beyond the President’s salary.  It
similarly would have violated the Constitution for Congress to have refused to
create the Supreme Court at all.  Yet, in none of these cases would a court be
available to enforce a norm we would likely regard as a requirement of consti-
tutional law.  Unenforceability does not mean we should read these norms out
of the Constitution.  Rhetoric matters, and, as Justice Scalia has noted in an-
other context, it is more powerful to call someone a “crook” than simply to
note they are “wrong-headed, naive, [and] ineffective.”10  In the debate over ju-
dicial independence, it is important, if true, to say that certain forms of assault
on the courts are not merely dangerous, wrong-headed, and unprincipled, but
also unconstitutional.
A.  Judicial Independence and Interbranch Review
At the federal level, the foundational statement on interbranch judicial re-
view is, of course, Marbury v. Madison.11  In his opinion for the Court, Chief
Justice John Marshall laid the groundwork for judicial review of both executive
and legislative exercises of power.  With regard to the former, he imported and
implicitly constitutionalized a distinction from English mandamus law between
acts of the executive that are political, and thus beyond judicial inquiry, and
those that are ministerial, and thus open to judicial review.12  Although it was
                                                          
9. See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16
(1992) (“The courts are an important element, but not the only element, in maintaining a constitu-
tional order.  That task is necessarily shared with Congress, the President, the states, and the general
public.”).
10. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 713 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. Marshall wrote:
By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain important
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable
only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience.  To aid him in the per-
formance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority
and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the
manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power
to control that discretion.  The subjects are political. . . .  [T]he acts of such an officer, as an
officer, can never be examinable by the courts.
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is di-
rected peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on
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this part of Marbury that most inflamed the Jeffersonians, it effectively laid the
basis for all of American administrative law.  The doctrine truly has faced no
serious intellectual challenge in 200 years.
With regard to the judicial review of statutes, Marshall asserted three fun-
damental propositions.  First, the Constitution expresses the supreme will of
the people.13  Second, the Constitution invalidates any legislative act contrary to
its provisions.14  Third, when an exercise of right or power in a properly pre-
sented case depends on an unconstitutional statute, a federal court is obliged to
declare the statute unconstitutional and to give it no force or effect.15
Volumes have been written assessing the persuasiveness of Marshall’s view
from the perspective of constitutional theory and history.  However, it seems
that the existence of federal judicial review to control legislative acts was
widely expected prior to Marbury.16  Indeed, despite Antifederalist opposition
to judicial review from the 1780s onward, lingering doubts about its propriety
all but evaporated by 1820 at both the state and federal levels.17  Even Pennsyl-
vania Justice (later Chief Justice) John Bannister Gibson, whose dissenting
opinion in Eakin v. Raub18offered one of the later and more eloquent critiques
of Marshall’s analysis, abandoned his opposition to judicial review by 1845.19
Specific evidence exists that the founding generation expected interbranch
judicial review to be a feature of the new national government, the most fa-
mous of which is Hamilton’s defense of judicial review in The Federalist.20  Mar-
shall, however, did not cite Hamilton’s analysis, nor did he rely on precedents
in state and federal courts prior to Marbury, or even evidence in the Judiciary
Act of 1789.21  Instead, he deduced the expectation of judicial review from con-
                                                          
the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for
his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.
. . . [W]here a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the per-
formance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured
has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.
Id. at 165-66.
13. See id. at 176-77.
14. See id. at 177.
15. See id. at 177-78.
16. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5-12 (5th ed. 1995).
17. See id. at 12.
18. 51 Pa. Rep. (12 Sargent & Rawle) 330, 343 (1825).
19. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 16, at 12.
20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
21. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 16, at 12.  Section 25 of the Judiciary Act provided,
among other things,
[t]hat a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in
which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or
statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their
validity . . . may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United
States upon a writ of error . . . .
This would seem to contemplate expressly that the Supreme Court might affirm the judgment of a
state court invalidating a statute of the United States.  Cf. GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER:
ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 150-51 (1997) (asserting that “influential members” of the First
Congress thought the power of judicial review was “implicit in Article III”).
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stitutional theory, particularly from three features of the 1789 Constitution: its
status as fundamental law, its written character, and its vesting of judicial
power, “emphatically the province and duty . . . to say what the law is.”22  In
other words, under the theory of popular sovereignty, Marshall concluded that
the convergence of a written constitution with an independent judiciary dic-
tated that the courts have the power and obligation to enforce constitutional
limits on the power of the legislature.
Numerous commentators over the course of two centuries (including, I
would guess, every constitutional law teacher who has ever lived) have pointed
out that, in the abstract, Marshall’s conclusions are not absolutely compelled by
his premises.  France, for example, has a written constitution and a separation
of powers system that is, if any thing, more categorically separationist than
ours.23  Despite these facts (and perhaps because of the latter), France did not
have anything like American-style judicial review prior to 1958—and even now
does not leave the constitutional review task to ordinary courts.24  As a matter
of purely philosophical interpretation, Marshall would seem not to have proved
his case.  As an interpretation of then-recent constitutional history, however,
Marshall’s analysis was compelling.  It captured with total accuracy the flavor
of constitutional ideas that were dominant in late eighteenth century America.
This is presumably why his opinion won such widespread acceptance in a rela-
tively short time.
When reorganizing government just before the Revolution, the predomi-
nant concern of Americans had been freeing legislative and judicial power from
executive control.25  The judiciary was not yet clearly conceptualized as a dis-
tinct branch of government.  Rather, the administration of justice was com-
monly conflated with the executive power.  The power of adjudication impli-
cated the Crown fully because colonial judges served at the King’s pleasure and
the Privy Council was the court of last resort for the colonists.26  When the
colonies turned to creating the first wave of new constitutions, their focus was
on curbing the magistracy and establishing the broadest scope of legislative
                                                          
In terms of other evidence supporting judicial review, the journals of the 1787 Philadelphia Con-
vention, of course, had not been published when Marshall wrote the Marbury opinion.  Even if jurists
of Marshall’s period would have considered the subjective expectations of individual drafters to be
relevant—which they probably would not—the variety of Framers’ statements supportive of judicial
review would not yet have been available to the Court for citation.
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
23. See JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23-23, 78-86 (1992) (on separation of legisla-
tive and judicial power, and of legislative and executive power); Helen McCleave Cake, The French
Conseil d’Etat—An Essay on Administrative Jurisprudence, 24 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 318 (1972) (on
separation of executive and judicial power).
24. See BELL, supra note 23, at 29-41.
25. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 157
(1969).
26. See id. at 159.
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power.27  Judges were freed from the power of the governor, but subjected in
substantial measure to legislative supervision.28
At this same time, Americans were increasingly preoccupied with the im-
portance of written documents as sources of constraint against arbitrary power.
Although Americans were devotees of the notion of higher or fundamental
law,29 the failure to put that law into written form came to be seen as an invita-
tion to discretion—especially judicial discretion—that might lead to departures
from reason and justice.30  The revolutionary generation had little experience in
enacting the kind of programmatic policy agenda we expect of legislatures to-
day.31  Instead, by seeking to codify legal principles as statutes, Americans were
hoping for clear and unchangeable statements of natural justice that judges
would be able, and required, to follow mechanically.32
By the mid-1780s, the political winds had shifted profoundly.  Anxiety
about legislative arbitrariness, no longer considered less dangerous than execu-
tive oppression, was spreading.  Constitutional reformers began to emphasize
the necessity of separating the judicial from the legislative power as the only
plausible safeguard against legislative tyranny.  According to Gordon Wood,
“[n]early all” of the 1780s’ proposals for constitutional reform were aimed at a
separation of the three powers of government—legislative, executive, and judi-
cial.33  It was during this time that the old theory of balanced government, in
which distinct governmental institutions represented various social orders,34 de-
cisively shifted to the new American version of separation of powers, in which
each branch of government was charged predominantly with its own distinct
function, the discharge of which was invariably representative of the whole
people:
The assumption behind this remarkable elaboration and diffusion of the idea of the
separation of powers was that all governmental power, whether in the hands of gov-
ernors, judges, senators, or representatives, was essentially indistinguishable; that is,
power in the hands of the people’s “immediate representatives” in the lower houses
of the legislatures was basically no different, no less dangerous, than power in the
hands of the governors, senators, and judges.35
The shift in sentiment occurred, in part, because the revolutionary legislatures
so abused their authority.  Their written output did not turn out to be self-
evidently just; nor, in their superabundance, did new statutes significantly limit
judicial discretion.  If anything, legislative interference in the administration of
justice was provoking widespread distrust of legislative devotion to the public
                                                          
27. See id. at 135-50.
28. See id. at 160-61.
29. See id. at 292-95.
30. See id. at 298-301.
31. On the evolution of colonial and revolutionary legislative activity, see JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 213-17 (1997).
32. See WOOD, supra note 25, at 301-02.
33. Id. at 452.
34. See RAKOVE, supra note 31, at 245.
35. WOOD, supra note 25, at 453.
SHANE.FMT 04/01/99  5:00 PM
Page 21: Summer 1998] INTERBRANCH ACCOUNTABILITY 29
interest.36  As a consequence, of all the branches of government, it was clearly
the judicial branch that was benefiting most from constitutional reform from
the 1780s on.37
Wood credits James Iredell of North Carolina as having understood with
special prescience the direction in which American constitutional thought was
proceeding.  Iredell’s remarks illustrated a shift from faith in statutes as written
documents intended to constrain judges to faith in the Constitution as a written
document intended to restrain the abuses of legislative power.  He called judi-
cial review “unavoidable” because the Constitution was not “a mere imaginary
thing, about which ten thousand different opinions may be formed, but a writ-
ten document to which all may have recourse, and to which, therefore, the
judges cannot willfully blind themselves.”38
Moreover, by the end of the 1780s, at least five states were moving
“gingerly and often ambiguously in isolated but important cases to impose re-
straints on what the legislatures were enacting as law.”39  This was no threat to
republicanism because, as expressed by James Wilson:
The executive and judicial powers are now drawn from the same source, are now
animated by the same principles, and are now directed to the same ends, with the leg-
islative authority: they who execute, and they who administer the laws, are so much
the servants, and therefore as much the friends of the people, as those who make
them.40
It is reasonable today to read these same foundational premises into all our
state constitutions, both for the original states and for those that came later.41
All states have embraced written constitutions and some checks-and-balances
                                                          
36. See id. at 454.
37. See id. at 453-54.
38. Id. at 461-62.
39. Id. at 454-55.
40. Id. at 598.
41. Because Rhode Island and Connecticut were corporate colonies, they did not originally frame
new constitutions, but reenacted their existing charters with “minor verbal changes.”  Id. at 276-77.  As
a consequence, the written statements of fundamental law with which they commenced independent
statehood did not embrace separation of powers principles to the same degree as in the other former
colonies.  “Modern” separation of powers did not become an explicit part of these states’ constitutions
until the 1818 Connecticut Constitution, see CONN. CONST. art. 2, and the 1842 Rhode Island Constitu-
tion, see R.I. CONST. art. 5, respectively.  Former Connecticut Chief Justice Ellen A. Peters has specu-
lated that this history, at least in Connecticut, has produced a pattern in which judicial authority to re-
voke a state statute on state constitutional grounds has been used only rarely.  See Ellen A. Peters,
Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1543, 1549 (1997).  Nonetheless, both states have now long recognized judicial power, and obligation,
to review the constitutionality of state statutes.
Of course, a number of the state constitutions authorize judicial review expressly or by conspicuous
implication.  See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 11, § 1:
All laws in force and effect on June 30, 1983, not inconsistent with this Constitution shall re-
main in force and effect; but such laws may be amended or repealed and shall be subject to
judicial decision as to their validity when  passed and to any limitations imposed by their own
terms.
For any such state, one need not resort so extensively to constitutional theory to substantiate the
point that judicial review of state statutes is intended to be a critical aspect of the state’s checks and
balances system.
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version of the separation of powers.  In the American constitutional tradition,
the core significance of these developments is everywhere the same:  The citi-
zens of each state depend upon the judicial branch to make real the delineation
and limitation of legislative and executive powers that the state constitutions
recognize.  This may not be inevitably true as a matter of pure logical analysis.
It may not be true in France or in other countries with different political cul-
tures and constitutional traditions.  It is true, however, in the United States.
The capacity of courts to invalidate legislative or executive initiative is a ca-
pacity that either of the nonjudicial branches might resent on at least some oc-
casions.  It therefore follows from the mandatory character of judicial review
that the judiciary in every state must have sufficient decisional independence to
perform its interbranch policing function steadfastly.  That does not preclude
judicial elections.  It does not require lifetime tenure for state judges.  It pre-
sumably would, however, prevent state legislatures from depriving state courts
of jurisdiction to hear challenges to state statutes as exceeding the bounds of
the legislature’s constitutional authority.  It would invalidate state legislation
conditioning judicial appropriations on the favorable exercise of judicial re-
view.  In virtually all cases, it would make it unconstitutional to treat a state
judge’s decision to enforce constitutional limits on other branches’ powers as
providing grounds for impeachment and removal.  It is, in short, a requirement
of substance.  It is not exaggeration to say that a republican system of govern-
ment, defined in the American tradition, depends upon the judicial capacity to
enforce constitutional limits on legislative and executive power.  Independence
sufficient to render judicial review meaningful is a corollary requirement of re-
publican constitutional order.
B.  Federal Expectations of State Judicial Review
Policing their sister branches is not the only politically irritating task as-
signed to state courts.  After declaring the status of the Constitution and the
laws “made in pursuance thereof” as “the supreme law of the land,” the Su-
premacy Clause provides: “[T]he Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing.”42  The obvious implications of this provision are that state legislative
and executive acts shall be subject to judicial review for consistency with fed-
eral law and that state judiciaries must, therefore, enjoy sufficient independ-
ence to render their federal review function meaningful.
There was consensus among the Framers that judicial enforcement of na-
tional law would be imperative to the success of the new union.  Judicial review
was the most modest of the options apparently available and then under de-
bate.  The alternatives would have been institutionalizing a national veto power
over state legislation or authorizing the use of force against states, whether
military or prosecutorial.43
                                                          
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
43. See RAKOVE, supra note 31, at 172.
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The fundamental role of state courts in preserving the constitutional
scheme was reinforced by the Framers’ decision not to insist upon the creation
of national courts of original jurisdiction.44  To assuage the anxieties of those
who feared the nationalizing impact of a fully articulated federal court system,
the Framers went no further than to vest discretion in Congress to constitute
“inferior tribunals.”45  This decision left Congress the discretion to rely entirely
upon state courts for the original hearing of all “federal question” cases, a
prospect that would have been unthinkable without a firm expectation that
state courts would take their review powers seriously.  As historian Jack
Rakove has put the matter:  “In this sense the supremacy clause marked an at-
tempt to incorporate a principle of judicial review into all the state govern-
ments by the unilateral fiat of the Constitution.”46
However ambitious this new role for state courts may have appeared in
1789, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment intensified its importance
profoundly.  The new Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses not only im-
posed new and profoundly significant state obligations to be enforced through
judicial review, but section five of the Amendment, authorizing its implementa-
tion through national legislation, gave Congress the additional and wide-
ranging power to create federal rights enforceable in state courts—a power un-
encumbered by Tenth and Eleventh Amendment limitations.47
Moreover, the Due Process Clause—as it operated on the state courts
themselves—provided a new federal guarantee of judicial formality and impar-
tiality in the resolution of every state adjudication.  It has been used, for exam-
ple, to invalidate a statutory scheme that would give an adjudicator a financial
stake in particular adjudicatory outcomes.48 Similarly, it would prohibit impos-
                                                          
44. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 2-3 (1989).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1.
46. RAKOVE, supra note 31, at 175.
At the ABA symposium, Professor Geyh suggested that it might be problematic to regard the Su-
premacy Clause as imposing an obligation of judicial independence on the states because the Framers
truly did not think the existence of the clause, by itself, would produce reliable state fidelity to state
law.  Professor Rakove takes a similar stance:  “The supremacy clause could only encourage state
judges to aspire to the enhanced notion of judicial independence on which it was premised; it provided
more of an incentive than a mandate, even if the framers hoped that incentive would evolve into a
norm of judicial behavior.”  Id.  It is certainly evidence of the founding generation’s concern about
state fidelity to federal law that the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for Supreme Court appellate re-
view of state judgments rejecting claims based on assertions of federal right.
I would argue, however, that early efforts—such as the Judicary Act of 1789—to buttress the effi-
cacy of state judicial review based on federal law actually strengthen the argument that the meaningful
conduct of such review and the independence necessary to assure it ought be considered matters of
constitutional obligation.  The fact that the First Congress recognized that such obligations would not
likely be enforceable except through Supreme Court review was surely not intended to diminish the
duty of state judges to apply federal law conscientiously.  Instead, their enactment confirms the aspira-
tional meaning of the Supremacy Clause, which ought now guide its interpretation.
47. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Eleventh Amendment); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) (Tenth Amendment).
48. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (invalidating administrative disciplinary hearing
before the Alabama Optometry Board because of board members’ pecuniary interest in the outcome
of the proceeding); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (invalidating enforcement scheme for state
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ing on a state adjudicatory system any other structural feature that would con-
spicuously compromise the obligation of state judges to decide cases based
solely on the records presented to them.  A rule of procedure authorizing ex
parte contacts in pending cases by either the Governor or by state legislators
would be a clear example.49
The degree of judicial independence implicitly required by the Supremacy
and Due Process Clauses may appear insignificant because it is hard to imagine
that any state would so shockingly politicize its judiciary as to come close to a
systematic violation of such a mandate.  After all, we are talking about a mini-
mum “floor” level of judicial independence as a constitutional guarantee, not
its furthest possible institutionalization.50  As a result, no federal court is ever
likely to reach an issue of state judicial behavior unless the state court failed to
apply federal law properly or to afford due process in a particular case.  In
these instances, relief would involve no more than vacating the particular
judgment or proceeding rather than an ambitious institutional injunction aimed
at bolstering the independence of the state courts.  The suspicion that judicial
error had been induced by an impermissibly intimidating climate for state
judges would not likely bring additional relief.
But the fact that it is difficult to imagine suing a state for its systemic failure
to provide an independent judiciary is chiefly a reflection of how deeply we
have collectively internalized the judicial independence norm.  Our right to in-
dependent state judiciaries is no less fundamental because it is so little doubted
and, in general, so widely observed.  Our common allegiance to the value of
state judicial independence confirms that independence represents, to some
degree, not merely an ideal, but an entitlement.  If things truly got bad enough,
constitutional redress would be imaginable.
                                                          
prohibition act under which town mayor, who tried cases, would recover his own legal costs only if the
defendant were convicted).
49. Cf. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993)
(upholding application to the President and his staff of a statutory ban on ex parte communications
with administrative adjudicators regarding a formal on-the-record proceeding).
50. At the ABA symposium, Professor Geyh suggested that, for this reason, my argument might
have some backfire potential.  By underscoring the modest nature of any trans-jurisdictional constitu-
tional obligation of judicial independence, Professor Geyh worries that I may be suggesting, or even
highlighting, the discretion states have to cut judicial independence back to that baseline.  Thus, states
that now go beyond what most likely could be considered the mandatory baseline—for example, by
providing for appointed judges removable only by impeachment—might realize that they could move
to a system less protective of judicial independence, such as an elected judiciary, without violating any
federal mandate for judicial independence.
As much as I sympathize with Professor Geyh’s point, I do not think there is anything we can do to
prevent states from realizing they have substantial discretion to trim the formal accouterments of judi-
cial independence if they are so disposed.  In contrast, I think it an important contribution to public
debate to point out that the baseline value—sufficient decisional independence to conduct meaningful
and impartial judicial review—is a mandatory feature of governance under any American written con-
stitution that embraces a checks-and-balances system, which all do.
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III
POTENTIAL INTERBRANCH INCURSIONS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
THE LIMITS ON JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AS A SELF-PROTECTIVE STRATEGY
A.  Judicial Restraint as a General Strategy for Supporting Judicial
Independence
In assessing contemporary threats to the decisional independence of state
courts, the culprits chiefly cited are judicial elections and their corollary, cam-
paign fund-raising.  But the quality of judicial independence at the state level
depends also on the attitudes and activities of the state legislative and executive
branches.  The sources of potential legislative leverage over state courts are
mostly familiar.  The most obvious is appropriations power.  State legislatures
can severely hamper the courts’ ability to do their work conscientiously by de-
nying them sufficient resources to accomplish their tasks.  In many states, the
legislature also has the power to curtail the jurisdiction of state courts, limit in-
creases in judicial compensation, and determine appropriate procedures for ju-
dicial discipline and removal.  Any of these powers could be used in retaliation
against unpopular courts.  Finally, state legislatures can effectively politicize is-
sues of judicial performance either formally, through oversight hearings, or in-
formally, during election campaigns.  The sum of these powers affords state
legislators a significant capacity to intrude upon judicial independence.51
The executive also has the power to intimidate the judiciary.  Like state
legislators, a governor can take public issue with either individual judicial deci-
sions or with the overall performance of the judiciary.  Such criticism might be-
come especially heated during campaigns for elected judgeships or during gu-
bernatorial campaigns.52  The executive also has the power of criminal
investigation.  It is not inconceivable that a state executive branch would target
its limited resources to investigate judges whose decisions were displeasing to
the executive.53  In the same vein, the executive also could be a source of refer-
                                                          
51. It is plausible that these tendencies may grow worse in states that adopt legislative term limits.
There is already evidence that term limits are having an adverse impact on civility within state legisla-
tures as the prospects diminish for long-term friendships and working relationships among legislators.
See William Schneider, Where the Sun’s Setting on Comity, NAT’L J., Aug. 15, 1998, at 1950.  One
would expect a similar diminution in short-term legislators’ allegiance to long-term institutional values
that simply may appear less salient in the day-to-day political life of a legislative “short-timer.”
52. A notorious example involves Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist’s public criticisms of for-
mer Supreme Court Justice Penny White.  See Jeff Woods, Sundquist Admits Early Ballot to Boot
White, NASHVILLE BANNER, July 26, 1996, at B2.  White was targeted as “soft on crime” for joining
(without a separate opinion) a unanimous Tennessee Supreme Court decision overturning a death sen-
tence.  See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to
Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 313-14
(1997).
53. Supporters of former federal judge Harry Claiborne, who was impeached and removed in 1986
following his conviction two years earlier for filing false tax returns, have argued that his prosecution
occurred in retaliation for a number of rulings in which he had been critical of the Justice Department
and of the FBI.  See Todd D. Peterson, The Role of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal
of Federal Judges, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 809, 872-79 (1993).  The conduct of that investigation and the
resulting criminal trial and impeachment were strongly criticized in a Nevada Supreme Court opinion
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rals to agencies within state judiciaries that might be legally charged with the
discipline (and even removal) of state judges.  Yet another source of leverage
may exist if the state executive has a role in reviewing the judiciary’s budget re-
quests.  Although some state legislatures receive judicial budget requests di-
rectly from the courts, others receive such requests as part of a gubernatorial
budget submission.  Even if a state’s judiciary enjoys independent authority to
submit its budget proposals directly, the governor’s support may be critical to
eliciting legislative enactment of the judiciary’s requests.
The process of judicial appointments—namely, through gubernatorial
nomination and legislative confirmation—also creates problems for judicial in-
dependence.  Judicial independence of state court judges is threatened when
they become too concerned with their prospects for promotion and worry too
much about whether potential decisions on their current court could compro-
mise their political prospects for reaching a higher court.  Without the en-
dorsement of the nonjudicial branches, even the most meritorious of lower-
court judges cannot advance to another position in an appointive system.
Because the nonjudicial branches are critical to the preservation of judicial
independence, a number of commentators have urged the courts, as a self-
preserving strategy, to practice so-called judicial restraint in the exercise of ju-
dicial review—especially judicial review aimed at enforcing constitutional pro-
visions.54  The animating thought seems to be that the failure to practice judicial
restraint—a failure that is typically called judicial activism—so threatens to an-
tagonize the nonjudicial branches (and the public) that activist courts have only
themselves to blame if their sister branches seek to act out their displeasure
through curbs on judicial independence.  Although there are several sound
ways of understanding this advice, the unadorned recommendation is not
among them.  In general, courts cannot and should not seek to preserve their
independence through reflexive deference to other branches’ political deci-
sionmaking or by shrinking from unpopular judgments that defend constitu-
tional rights.
Three tenable understandings of judicial restraint ought to be noted at the
outset.  The first is that state courts, like their federal counterparts, should con-
sider seriously the circumstances under which judicial review may be unneces-
sary.  A variety of doctrines—standing, ripeness, and reviewability chief among
them—permit federal courts to forgo judicial review when the stakes involved
do not warrant a judgment on the merits.  Their implementation is consistent
with a philosophy well articulated by Lord John Russell, who was quoted by
Woodrow Wilson in his famous 1885 treatise, Congressional Government:
“Every political constitution in which different bodies share the supreme power
is only enabled to exist by the forbearance of those among whom this power is
                                                          
refusing to impose additional discipline on Judge Claiborne.  See State Bar v. Claiborne, 756 P.2d 464
(Nev. 1988).
54. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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distributed.”55  In other words, if any branch pushes its plausible powers to the
extreme, governance fails.  Procedural doctrines that limit access to constitu-
tional judgments institutionalize this insight.
State courts ought to be especially cautious in the relaxation of standing re-
quirements.  Pennsylvania, for example, has gone rather far in its willingness to
police constitutional rules governing legislative procedures in situations where
no more is at stake than the sort of generalized political grievance that a federal
court would eschew.56  This is not to deny the importance of constitutionally
prescribed legislative processes, but rather to question whether the remedy for
their nonobservance ought to be political instead of judicial.  When a state judi-
ciary extends its reach into policing legislative observance of procedural re-
quirements, it risks unnecessarily provoking legislative resentment—an espe-
cially dubious enterprise if the state judiciary also resists legislative oversight of
judicial procedures.
The second, perhaps obvious, counsel is that judges should feel deeply the
difference between the legislative and judicial functions, even if some element
of policymaking is entailed in both.  Judicial determinations ought to be per-
suasively based in background legal materials—constitutions, statutes, regula-
tions, and judicial precedents.  Courts ought to defer to nonjudicial authorities,
not out of any self-preservative instinct, but because such deference is the law.
Following McCulloch v. Maryland,57 for example, Congress is legally entitled to
exercise its implied powers in any manner that rationally furthers a legitimate
purpose without transgressing any constitutional provision.  For a federal court
to demand more than rationality in the typical implied powers case would not
be to engage in activism; it would be to commit legal error.  This presumably
holds as well under state constitutions.
Third, state courts, like their federal counterparts, should beware of gener-
ating judicially enforceable liability rules that are unlikely to be implemented in
a principled and responsible way.  For example, the great problem with the
federal nondelegation doctrine58 is that any serious enforcement would require
                                                          
55. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 163
(John Hopkins Paperbacks ed. 1981) (1885).
56. See, e.g., Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1988) (permitting a taxpayer to challenge the
date of a judicial election).  This phenomenon is discussed from an especially critical perspective in
Bruce Ledewitz, What’s Really Wrong with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania?, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 409,
423-26 (1994).
57. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
58. The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from abdicating to others “the essential legisla-
tive functions” with which it is vested by Article I, § 1 of the Constitution.  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).  In theory, the Supreme Court enforces the doctrine
by requiring Congress to “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.”  J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
409 (1928).  The Court, however, has only twice found that Congress has violated the nondelegation
doctrine—both times with respect to provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act.  See Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating delegation to President of powers to regulate
interstate commerce in oil pumped in violation of state law); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S.
at 495 (invalidating delegation to private parties of power to devise enforceable rules of fair competi-
tion).
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courts to exercise judgment in a manner that would invite indefensible and un-
acknowledged subjectivity.  A judge obligated to determine de novo whether a
legislature has done “enough” to specify the fundamental policy judgments that
ought guide the exercise of a statutorily delegated power would be hard-
pressed to avoid answering, “Yes,” whenever the judge agrees with the statute,
and, “No,” when it seems unwise.  In such a situation, courts ought to police a
sister branch lightly because engaging more deeply in the problem risks the
abandonment of judicial self-discipline.59
Having acknowledged these three appropriate versions of self-restraint, I
still cannot endorse the unnuanced call for judicial restraint as it is usually
made.  The usual recommendation is that courts should defer wherever possi-
ble to the political judgments of the executive and legislative branches and to
the political and moral values widely shared by the larger polity.  To enter into
this topic comprehensively would be to traverse a subject that probably has oc-
cupied more scholarly attention than any other in the legal academy since
Brown v. Board of Education,60 and perhaps since Marbury.  I do not do so
here, in part because, in an earlier article, I have already tried to explicate the
common philosophies of judicial restraint and to show why they are weakly jus-
tified, based on a misunderstanding of the role of majoritarian government un-
der our Constitution, and inconsistent with a higher ideal of judicial self-
discipline, which often requires that judges second-guess the judgments of other
institutional actors.61  In discussing the case for restraint by state courts, I will
limit myself to four broad countervailing arguments that may be especially sali-
ent in the context of state institutions.
The first such argument is that the case for judicial restraint at the federal
level is often based on a variety of institutional considerations that are less
forceful at the state level.62  It is often urged that, because federal judges are
unelected, they have no legitimate role to play in interjecting policy judgments
into their decisional processes.  As strongly as I argue below against judicial
elections, the fact is that, as long as the overwhelming majority of state judges
run for office, they have whatever policymaking legitimacy is conferred by a di-
rect electoral connection.
Another supposed defect of federal innovation in constitutional doctrine is
that any such ruling by the United States Supreme Court constrains federalism
by imposing a uniform legal interpretation on all fifty states.  This problem ob-
viously does not affect state courts.  Additionally, it is sometimes urged that
federal courts resist constitutional rulings because it would require an extraor-
                                                          
59. Cf. I K.C. DAVID & R.J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6, at 76-79 (1994).
The Supreme Court is unlikely to “be able to identify a justiciable standard that would perform tolera-
bly well the function of distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional delegations of
power to agencies.”  Id. at 79.
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. See Peter M. Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531 (1988).
62. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV.
389, 429-30 (1998).
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dinary effort to overcome the judicial ruling through a constitutional amend-
ment.  Mobilizing citizens and legislatures to amend state constitutions is, by
comparison, a far easier task.  On each of these grounds, state courts are argua-
bly better situated to take a more aggressive stance than do the federal courts
in the implementation of their respective constitutions.
The second general reason why truly thoroughgoing judicial restraint may
be problematic is that state courts cannot plausibly avert controversy through
timidity.  Most state courts’ judicial decisions likely to prompt voter dissatisfac-
tion arise from the diligent application of federal constitutional law—especially
with regard to criminal procedure and abortion.63  State courts have no legiti-
mate alternative to the conscientious application of that law, the development
of which they simply cannot control.
Moreover, courts are targeted for scathing criticism when they ratify gov-
ernment action as much as when they overturn it.  Critics routinely lambaste
the United States Supreme Court for alleged creativity in the invention of fun-
damental rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Such creativity, however, is no more a departure from the his-
toric Constitution than was the Court’s failure to read any significant meaning
into the privileges and immunities clause of the same amendment.64  The
Court’s aggressiveness, in Dred Scott,65 in finding grounds to invalidate the Mis-
souri Compromise is appropriately infamous, but so are its failures to enforce
the Fifteenth Amendment and to require prompt racial desegregation of our
public schools.  The Court’s historic complicity with respect to the worst be-
havior of both state and federal governments has cast at least as much doubt on
its legitimacy as has its alleged activism.  Although political conservatives are
today’s most vituperative critics of judicial decisionmaking, this was not always
so.66  If the Supreme Court persists in its current aggressiveness in protecting
property rights67 and in curtailing Congress’s regulatory powers,68 there will
surely be left-wing backlash.  State courts should attend to all of this history in
deciding whether judicial restraint can protect them from politicization and in-
terbranch intimidation.
The third broad point to consider is that, in practice and in theory, the
courts’ most successful defense of their independence has not been restraint per
                                                          
63. Compare, for example, the recent and unsuccessful campaign to oust California’s Chief Justice
Ronald George and Associate Justice Ming Chin based on their votes to extend abortion rights under
the California Constitution.  See, e.g., Abortion Foes Lobby Voters to Oust California Justices; Prose-
cutors, Police and Prominent Figures from Both Political Parties Support the Judges, GREENSBORO
NEWS & REC. (N.C.), Sept. 21, 1998, at A2.  It is hard to believe the campaign against them would
have been any less virulent had they ruled for pro-choice plaintiffs in reliance on Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
64. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
65. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
66. Barry Friedman, “Things Forgotten” in the Debate over Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 737, 753-55 (1998).
67. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act
as exceeding Congress’s regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause).
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se, but a self-disciplined commitment to a proper institutional role.  In a rule of
law system such as ours, where countermajoritarian constitutions often envision
judicial second-guessing of executive and legislative authorities, disciplined ad-
herence to the law will often compel conscientious judges not to defer to the
political judgments of others.  Of course, judges should not forgo deference on
the sole or primary ground that they personally would have preferred the ex-
ecutive or the legislature to have conducted itself differently.  Rather, a judge
should forgo deference when, upon diligent and open-minded consideration of
all legally relevant materials and the facts before the court, he or she comes to
the good-faith, intellectual conclusion that the best interpretation of the law
forecloses the political judgment being challenged.  Only by following the path
of the law can judges retain the high ground in public debate over their roles—
even if the path of the law entails politically controversial judgments and inter-
pretations.
This approach to constitutional law, at both the state and federal levels,
represents what I believe is our dominant national tradition of constitutional
interpretation—which I have elsewhere called “aspirationalism”:
viewing the Constitution as a signal of the kind of government under which we would
like to live, and interpreting that Constitution over time to reach better approxima-
tions of that aspiration.  This vision treats as essential to constitutional understanding
the broad normative purposes that the Constitution invokes: “to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity.”  To use John Marshall’s words, those purposes are vindicated by
remembering “it is a constitution we are expounding,” that in a constitution, “only its
great outlines should be marked,” and that our constitution was “intended to endure
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human af-
fairs.”
Aspirationalism is not tantamount to regarding the Constitution as perfect, or per-
fectible through ingenious reading. . . .  Aspirationalism does insist, however, that new
or evolving understandings of the Constitution may not require formal amendment
for their implementation.  Cultural change, that is change in social understanding,
may make certain reasoned arguments compelling to later generations that earlier
generations did not foresee.69
Because this tradition is so dominant in our judicial history, I have found
the acerbity of some criticism of the Supreme Court rather difficult to under-
stand.  For example, there is much to be debated about whether the holdings of
Roe v. Wade70 were appropriate or appropriately defended, and I do not mean
to suggest that the controversy has an obvious resolution.  The Court’s critics
often argue, however, as if no sane interpreter of our Constitution could ever
have thought abortion implicated by its individual rights guarantees.  But, why
is that?  Perhaps the founding generation—or the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment—would have been puzzled by the precise question, “Does the
Constitution provide any protection for a woman to decide whether to bring
                                                          
69. Shane, supra note 61, at 550-51.  A similar position is expressed in SOTIRIOS BARBER, ON
WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 34-37 (1984).
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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her pregnancy to term?”  However, as a matter of natural law, our forbears
probably would have thought it implausible that government could constitu-
tionally limit the number of children a woman might bear or condition the im-
primatur of marriage on a solemn undertaking to have any minimum number
of children.  If this is true, then the general holding of Roe, reaffirmed in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,71 seems a quite plausible and principled exten-
sion of earlier generations’ aspirations for personal liberty.  Especially after the
Supreme Court had already affirmed constitutional protection to allow mar-
ried72 and unmarried persons73 access to contraceptives, the majority view in
Roe seems to me no less plausible than the dissent.
My point here, however, is not to reargue Roe v. Wade or to defend any
other particularly aggressive use of judicial review.  It is simply to underscore
that, even in controversial cases, conscientious judges operating at the highest
levels of craft and good judgment may come to the occasional conclusion that
the best view of the law precludes a particular legislative or executive initiative.
Withholding such a judgment, for fear of antagonizing the nonjudicial branches
of government in such a case, would be to abandon one of the core purposes of
judicial independence.  Courts unprepared ever to protect controversial per-
sonal liberties are no more in need of institutional independence than profes-
sors who are unwilling to challenge convention are in need of tenure.
This brings me to the fourth broad reason why judicial restraint tout court is
not an optimal strategy for state courts to follow in the pursuit of protecting
their independence.  In addition to being criticized justly for abandoning what I
have called the aspirationalist tradition of constitutional interpretation, unduly
restrained courts could be criticized for devaluing federalism by refusing to
take seriously the distinctiveness of state constitutions.  It is one of the most
common defenses of federalism that each state, with its distinct history, tradi-
tions, and economic, social, and political circumstances, has the capacity to pur-
sue its own set of public practices and ideals, so long as these are consistent
with the minimal constraints of federal law.  For state courts to forswear the
possibility that state constitutions can and should be interpreted as expressing
the distinctive ideals of a polity far smaller than the nation as a whole would be
to deprive Americans of an important component of the very diversity that
federalism promises.74
B.  Legitimacy Issues in Institutional Reform and “Inherent Powers” Cases
I believe that a state judiciary’s most self-protective stance is one of princi-
pled adherence to the law, rather than judicial restraint per se.  However, there
are two sets of cases that deserve special consideration.  The first—cases in-
volving the enforcement of a state legislature’s affirmative obligations to main-
                                                          
71. 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
72. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
74. See generally Schapiro, supra note 62.
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tain the quality of conditions in schools, mental hospitals, prisons, and other
state institutions—entails especially difficult remedial problems even when, in
principle, the state’s liability is clear.  The second also implicates state re-
sources, but does so in a context where state courts have been exceedingly
more activist than their federal counterparts—these are cases involving the as-
sertion of inherent judicial power to compel state support for the judiciary it-
self.  These cases, too rarely discussed in debates over judicial role, most effec-
tively illustrate the capacity of courts to consume whatever political support
they might have had from the nonjudicial branches of government or the larger
electorate.  In this context, a greater devotion to restraint might well be in or-
der.
In the last thirty-five years, there has been a marked increase in the number
of both state and federal lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of conditions
in public school systems, mental hospitals, and prisons.  Some critics of state
courts have counseled that state courts either forbear from finding any affirma-
tive state constitutional guarantees as to institutional conditions or interpret
such guarantees as nonjusticiable in order to avoid the remedial challenges that
inevitably draw a state judiciary into a policymaking role.75  Such exhortations
to judicial restraint could be understood in different ways.  One argument
might be that courts should eschew institutional conditions cases on the ground
that state constitutions simply do not authorize them.76  Alternatively, even if
state constitutions are conceded to impose affirmative guarantees with regard
to the quality of some state institutions, adjudicating compliance draws courts
into a policymaking role that is not entirely constrained by ordinary legal inter-
pretation.  It might, therefore, be urged that these cases pose unique legitimacy
problems that courts should avoid.77  It could further be argued that, even if
state constitutions impose justiciable guarantees regarding institutional condi-
tions and even if some judicial policymaking is legitimate in principle, nonjudi-
cial state authorities will deeply resent institutional remedies that impose sig-
nificant budgetary obligations and limit the resources available to fulfill other
worthy public purposes.  Therefore, courts might seek to avoid these cases be-
cause the political stakes are too high.  On any of these grounds, involvement in
institutional reform cases might elicit the kind of responsive pressure that will
threaten judicial independence.
The first proposition—that state constitutions should not be read as impos-
ing any affirmative obligations on state legislatures to maintain a certain quality
of schools, prisons, or mental hospitals—seems both improbable and futile.  In
the school finance area alone, courts in at least twenty states have declared that
state formulas for public school funding run afoul of one or another state con-
                                                          
75. See, e.g., Carrington, Judicial Independence, supra note 5, at 100.
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stitutional provision.78  Given the wide range of states involved, and the profes-
sional training and political acumen of most judges, it seems highly unlikely
that all of them are simply fabricating unpersuasive arguments to impose
school reform on state legislatures.  One would expect state constitutions to dif-
fer on this issue; judicial opinions in at least sixteen other states that deny
school funding claims suggest that they do.79  But, given the overwhelming im-
portance of public education, it would be amazing if all fifty state constitutions
left state legislatures complete discretion to determine the sufficiency of in-
terdistrict equity.
Even if state courts stayed out of the schools, there would still be many oc-
casions for adjudications concerning state institutions.  Because the Eighth
Amendment to the federal Constitution precludes “cruel and unusual punish-
ment,” and because the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause precludes
arbitrary treatment of anyone kept in state custody involuntarily,80 cases in-
volving prisons and mental institutions are inevitable.  Although states may win
such cases on the merits, they could not plausibly be dismissed by state courts
as nonjusticiable.  Thus, in adjudicating whether states are fulfilling their legal
obligations with regard to prisons, mental hospitals, and schools, state courts
should adhere to their essential adjudicatory role and do their best conscien-
tiously to construe the law.  If a state is not living up to its obligations, soundly
interpreted, state courts should not withhold judgment.
It is true that institutional cases—whether involving the adequacy of condi-
tions or funding equity—will entail significant remedial complexity.  This com-
plexity may itself pose substantial institutional problems for a court.  If a state
judge determines, based on a faithful interpretation of the law, that the rights
of public school students, prisoners, or mental health patients have been vio-
lated, the judge will then need “a theory of remedial design that links the un-
derstanding of rights to some measure of the remedy’s appropriate scope.”81  In
determining whether the remedy’s aims are to be compensatory, corrective,
prophylactic, or all three, the judge must address the following issues:  Should
the aim of a remedy be to restore plaintiffs to the position they would have en-
joyed but for the state’s violations of law?  If so, in what respects?  The school
desegregation cases, for example, have engendered significant debate as to
whether courts are empowered to redress inadequacies in the educational pro-
gramming provided to the targets of racial segregation, or only to seek to re-
store a pattern of school attendance that would have occurred but for the inten-
                                                          
78. See Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the
Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32 L. & SOC. REV. 175, 176 (1998).
79. Id.
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tional acts of racial separation.82  And, most important for the quality of inter-
branch relations, what is to be a court’s recourse if the state’s nonjudicial
branches resist efforts at remediation?
It is common for governors and legislators to bemoan the scope of judicial
interest-balancing and policymaking that answering such questions requires.
However, the legitimacy of remediation in institutional reform suits is sustained
by both history and principle.  As argued by Malcolm Feeley and Edward Ru-
bin in their superb study of prison reform litigation, the regulatory nature of
the modern administrative state demands a judicial administrative capacity de-
signed “to secure compliance with the law” by public institutions.83  The ad-
ministrative role of modern courts is a direct outgrowth of traditional equity
tools and doctrines being applied to new circumstances.84  The judicial policy
role entailed in equity jurisprudence has been played so often and for so long
by so many American courts that it has become conventional.  Voters and leg-
islators should now understand that “when courts are granted jurisdiction the
potentiality of policy making is inherent in that grant.  Part of the meaning of a
court, as that institution is understood in our culture, is that it will make public
policy under . . . constrained conditions.”85
Undoubtedly, what is most anxiety-producing about the institutional reme-
diation efforts of state (and federal) courts is the alleged resemblance between
the balancing judgments entailed in designing institutional remedies and the
balancing judgments typically thought to be the exclusive province of legisla-
tors.  Judicial policymaking in the course of remedial design is, however, neces-
sarily more constrained than legislative policymaking.  As a threshold matter,
in designing remedies, judges must “engage[] and connect[] with legal doctrine”
as it describes the legal wrongs involved and delimits a judge’s remedial pow-
ers.86  Although there may not be clear preexisting rules telling judges precisely
how much or how little they can do, judges are constrained in their use of doc-
trine by supervision and culture within the judiciary itself.87  In terms of super-
vision, trial judges are reviewable by appellate judges, often at multiple levels,
who provide highly regularized protection against wholly idiosyncratic judg-
ment.  In terms of culture, state courts, like other social institutions, “depend
upon embedded norms, and [the fact] that human agents are most powerfully
controlled by their internalized beliefs.”88  The internalized belief system of
American judges traditionally values deference to and accommodation of non-
                                                          
82. I have explored this uncertainty at length in Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies
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judicial authorities—even as it values providing every legal wrong with a rem-
edy.  Judges know they can attack problems only through existing structures,
which means that “[j]udicial administration . . . always involves negotiations,
persuasion, and the recruitment of allies from within and without the subject
institution.”89  In short, as described by Feeley and Rubin, judicial policymaking
“is a standard method of judicial action, . . . [with] distinct modalities.  . . .
When judges use these modalities, they are making public policy in the stan-
dard manner that our prevailing legal culture establishes—they are ‘talking the
talk.’”90  The “talk” they are “talking” is very different from the plenary discre-
tion enjoyed by a state legislature.
A relatively new attack on institutional remedies argues that judicial asser-
tiveness in the creation and enforcement of rights has been counterproductive.
Gerald Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope91 is but the most recent of several major
works suggesting that courts are profoundly limited in their capacity to advance
social reform, and that their remedial efforts actually may impede social prog-
ress.  The data, however, are far from clear in this regard.92  Feeley and Rubin,
for example, argue that, although the prison reform litigation movement may
not have yielded the desired degree of deinstitutionalization, the federal judici-
ary effectively ended the “Southern plantation” model of prisons and contrib-
uted significantly to the most important modern trends in prison administra-
tion.  These include the professionalization of corrections administration, the
evolution of national corrections standards, and the advent of increased bu-
reaucratic accountability within state prison systems.93  Similarly, Douglas S.
Reed of Georgetown University has found that some state supreme courts have
had a significant positive impact on the equitable distribution of public school-
ing resources, especially as compared to trends in states where courts have
stayed away from the issue.94  Both the magnitude and durability of these
changes is variable, but it is interesting, especially for those who advocate judi-
cial restraint, that the most aggressive courts appear to be the most successful
in eliciting reform rather than those that are deferential in the imposition of
remedies.95  This result echoes similarly suggestive findings in school desegrega-
tion cases.96
None of this is to deny the fact that legislators resent judicial intervention in
state institutions.  Aside from signaling possible political disagreement, a judi-
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cial declaration that a current school funding scheme is unconstitutional or that
some state institution does not meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause or Eighth Amendment will impinge on the legislators’ most precious as-
set—time—and limit the legislators’ freedom in distributing scarce state re-
sources.  Therefore, the manner in which a court comports itself may influence
whether courts engaged in institutional reform litigation will become vulner-
able to political retaliation.  A court may thus properly be alert to structuring
remedial processes to build institutional support for the court.  For example,
the court should ensure that both media and the citizenry have easy access to
judicial opinions and portions of the record relevant to remediation—perhaps
through a website.  Courts also may structure their orders to hold out the hope
for a relatively early extrication of the judiciary from remedial administration.
By making clear, for example, that relatively early compliance will entail less
expense and more deference than delayed compliance, courts may provide in-
centives for nonjudicial authorities to cooperate in developing, assessing, and
implementing genuine remedial alternatives.  In balancing the competing inter-
ests relevant to a particular remedy, the court may take into account strong
public concerns other than simply redressing the harms to the plaintiffs.97  For
example, courts may decide not to order the release of inmates from prisons
that fall short of constitutional requirements, even though the inmates are ulti-
mately entitled to be relieved of unconstitutional conditions.
In short, a court’s strongest defensive posture in an institutional reform case
is the same as it is in any case—be conscientious (and appear to be conscien-
tious) in following the law.  Do not shirk from the duty of reviewing the consti-
tutionality of institutional conditions.  If a court is required to balance com-
peting interests and make policy judgments, it should take care to acquire the
best possible information, to give state authorities ample opportunity to shape
constitutional remedies, and to create incentives for legal compliance by the
nonjudicial branches of government.  By conspicuously striving to implement
constitutional values on behalf of poor families, mental health patients, and
even prisoners, a court has an important opportunity to build understanding
and support for the judicial role.
The institutional cases that may be more troubling in terms of interbranch
relations and their implications for judicial independence do not involve public
schools, prisons, or mental institutions—but the courts themselves.  Courts in
roughly half the states have asserted inherent judicial power to compel legisla-
tive funding of the judiciary.98  Although the federal courts are most often sin-
gled out for their extraordinary independence, federal courts have never pur-
ported to exercise this power.  For example, I doubt federal judges have
thought to force Congress, on pain of contempt, to underwrite the undoubted
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judicial costs imposed when it federalizes what traditionally had been crimes
within exclusive state jurisdiction.  Yet, it is clear that thoughts akin to this
have crossed the minds of state judges.
Strictly speaking, the overwhelming majority of the “inherent powers” cases
are not separation of powers confrontations.  Courts are often funded at the
county level, and, most frequently, the judicial mandate that arises in an inher-
ent powers case orders a county or other local government to meet its statutory
or constitutional obligation to fund a particular judicial function.99  If one in-
dulges the assumption that state legislatures expect local governments to fulfill
their fiscal obligations, a court order toward that end does not really constitute
a confrontation between coequal branches.
Such confrontations, however, may well loom on the horizon.  In 1991, the
then-Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Sol Wachtler, sued Gov-
ernor Mario Cuomo, alleging that the New York courts had inherent power to
compel state government to provide nearly one billion dollars for the state ju-
dicial system.100  Although Governor Cuomo had originally supported the judi-
cial budget request, he ultimately submitted a budget at a figure ten percent
lower than the Wachtler proposal—a figure nearly three percent lower than the
previous year’s appropriation—in light of what Cuomo regarded to be a pro-
found budget crisis.101  Chief Judge Wachtler responded by filing suit.102  In a
move nearly as extraordinary, Governor Cuomo then brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to enjoin the
state court action.103
The branches ultimately settled their differences and withdrew their suits
when Governor Cuomo agreed to restore the judiciary budget to its previous
year’s funding level.104  Nonetheless, well-publicized budget shortfalls continued
to be greater than anticipated, and Governor Cuomo responded with successive
and difficult cuts in virtually every other sector of state spending.105  As a result,
the Chief Judge seemed to be insensitive to the budgetary pain inflicted on vir-
tually every other agency and appeared unreasonably aggressive in pushing for
substantial additional resources.  One commentator clearly saw the suit as a
setback for judicial independence:  “Although Wachtler v. Cuomo was success-
ful in publicizing the difficulties faced by the courts, there is no evidence that
the campaign mounted by the Chief Judge translated into public support for
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the judiciary. . . .  [P]ublic confidence in the courts may actually have eroded in
the wake of the suit.”106
A current Pennsylvania imbroglio raises the specter of similar confronta-
tions erupting in other states.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet as-
serted inherent judicial power to compel the state legislature to enact specific
levels of judicial appropriations.  But it has interpreted a reference in the
Commonwealth’s 1968 Constitution to a “unified” court system107 as implicitly
requiring the state to take over funding for all state courts, from the trial level
up.108  After the Court’s 1987 order to this effect was ignored for nine years, the
Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus directing the General Assembly to
comply with the Court’s original decision.109  It appointed Senior Pennsylvania
Superior Court Judge (and former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice) Frank
J. Montemuro as special master to study funding alternatives and the impact of
statewide funding, as well as to formulate a set of recommendations for a new
funding system.110  Judge Montemuro’s recommendations,111 issued on July 24,
1996, have not yet elicited legislative reform.112  If the General Assembly ac-
cepts the Supreme Court’s instruction as to the fact of its funding responsibili-
ties, it is not hard to imagine that the Supreme Court might be tempted at a
later date to instruct the legislature as to the precise level of those responsibili-
ties.
Cases like this, pitting a state’s highest judicial authority directly against its
highest nonjudicial authorities over an issue of fiscal support for the courts, are
troubling for at least two reasons, one legal and one political.  The legal prob-
lem is that, notwithstanding the frequency with which state courts invoke in-
herent power, there is often little persuasive legal support for its assertion.  The
federal courts provide ample evidence that an independent judiciary can exist
without the assertion of such a power, and it would be very difficult to persuade
either a legislature or its constituents that a particular level of funding is abso-
lutely necessary for the state’s judiciary to function as an effective coequal
branch.
Authority to determine the adequacy of judicial resources is sometimes as-
serted as a critical aspect of institutional autonomy, which provides a legal basis
to support the inherent judicial power to command appropriations.  In this con-
text, however, conflating judicial independence in the sense of institutional
autonomy with judicial independence in the sense of decisional integrity truly
leads to confusion.  When a court invokes separation of powers theory to assert
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authority over its own funding level, it is asserting not its independence, but its
coequality with the legislative and executive branches.  But coequality means
only that all branches are on par.  Because the executive cannot unilaterally de-
termine its own funding levels and even the legislature’s funding preferences
must pass muster with a veto-armed governor, it is hard to argue that a state’s
courts are deprived of being a coequal branch if they cannot insist on a par-
ticular level of appropriations irrespective of the political judgments of the
nonjudicial branches.
In asserting a state-level obligation to fund all state courts, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has opened itself to criticism that the legal basis for its judg-
ment was thin.  It is far from self-evident that the designation of a state’s court
system as “unified” dictates its funding mechanism.113  Given the procedural
posture in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acted, there was no record
before the court (or before the court of public opinion) to establish that dispa-
rate funding levels across the state had resulted in judicial inefficacy any-
where.114  Other states should be cautioned that, as meager as the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s support may have been, it was no less skimpy than the sup-
port existing in most states to assert an inherent power to compel appropria-
tions by the state legislature.  The Pennsylvania countdown to compliance now
reads, “Eleven years and counting.”
Politically, these cases are troubling because they inevitably cast the courts
in their most vulnerable position.  When a court purports to compel better
treatment for public schools, mental hospitals, or prisons, there are typically
constituencies outside the judiciary—as well as strongly held public norms—to
which the courts may implicitly appeal for support.  In contrast, when a court
seeks to compel support for the judiciary, it risks exposing how little popular
support may actually exist.  Legislative intransigence in the face of court-
funding orders threatens to undermine the judiciary doubly—once because
willful noncompliance with any judicial order weakens the presumptive
authority of state court judgments, and then again because noncompliance with
a judicial order to assist the courts must be read as a sign of the courts’ political,
as well as constitutional, weakness.
It may be instructive to compare Pennsylvania’s attempts to secure state-
wide judicial funding with Chief Judge Judith Kaye’s efforts in New York to re-
form its archaic and labyrinthine judicial structure, which includes eleven sepa-
rate trial courts115 complicating much litigation in New York.  Judge Kaye could
not have been tempted to hold this structure unconstitutional; it is expressly
embedded in the New York State Constitution.116 After four years of sophisti-
cated political effort, however, she was able to unite various proponents of
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court reform behind a bipartisan proposal to significantly streamline and con-
solidate the New York trial court system.117  Although Judge Kaye is a Demo-
crat, New York’s Republican governor, George Pataki, has endorsed the
plan.118  Judge Kaye’s skill in building alliances through judges who had previ-
ously served in the state legislature has been described as a key to her political
success.119
Because her plan has yet to be enacted, in some sense, Judge Kaye has no
more unified her court system than the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has suc-
ceeded in imposing statewide funding of its trial courts.  However, the key dif-
ference is that the delay in implementation of the New York plan is regarded as
discrediting the legislature rather than the judiciary.  A New York Times edito-
rial referred to the legislature’s failure to enact the reform plan as its “most
disappointing” performance.120  Judge Kaye seems better poised to accomplish
her objectives than the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Moreover, Judge Kaye
has risked none of her court’s authority in pressing her case.  This model may
be worth emulating by other courts intent on preserving their independence.
C.  Mutual Restraint and Sound Governance
One way of distilling the foregoing argument is that courts should be con-
scientious in the fulfillment of their duties, but should impinge upon legislative
or executive discretion only when the nature of judicial obligation, broadly
conceived, compels such a result.  Of course, it would be profoundly helpful if
the nonjudicial branches exercised the same restraint with regard to state
courts.  After all, the nonjudicial branches have the same capacity as the courts
to limit their interference with the other branches’ constitutional functions—
except as the nature of their duties may compel.  Legislators, for example, may
be empowered to curtail state court jurisdiction, but should only do so when
they believe the current grant of jurisdiction is somehow undermining the judi-
ciary’s capacity to function.  Likewise, budget exigencies may require a consci-
entious governor to withhold support for judicial appropriations requests, but
“executive restraint” should counsel governors to support those requests as
much as reasonably can be accommodated within the state’s overall fiscal plan.
The effective operation of all branches of government is critical to sound
governance.  If each branch exhibits forbearance in the exercise of powers that
impinge on other branches, the courts’ capacity to implement the law, the leg-
islature’s capacity to represent the people of the state in making law, and the
executive’s capacity to provide sound administration should all be advanced.
Forbearance of this sort recognizes that, although each branch in conscien-
tiously pursuing its constitutional functions will inevitably reach points of ten-
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sion with the other two, each branch has the capacity to advance the work of
the others and is willing, within appropriate constraints, to do so.
IV
INTERBRANCH ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE PROTECTION OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
Even if “restraint” does not adequately capture the judicial posture most
likely to promote healthy interbranch relations while protecting judicial inde-
pendence, it does not follow that courts must or should be oblivious to their
ability to build institutional support within the legislative and executive
branches.  The ideal should not be to establish a mood of invariably smiling
agreement, but rather to generate an ethos of mutual understanding and sup-
port.  The ideal should be one of interbranch accountability.
As scholars of judicial affairs have noted, part of the difficulty in improving
the quality of interbranch relations is a prevailing sense of uncertainty regard-
ing the appropriate forms of, and limits upon, judicial-nonjudicial contact.121  At
the federal level, the judiciary’s self-discipline in engaging in contacts with
Congress may have bolstered its credibility by avoiding any appearance that
federal judges are merely another species of political agent.122  The relative
aloofness of judges from ordinary politics also may have contributed to an aura
of impartiality that is an important institutional asset.  Nonetheless, as Profes-
sor Charles Geyh has noted, “too much separation begets unfamiliarity.  Un-
familiarity, in turn, begets mistrust, mistrust that could give way to debilitating
hostility in an era in which the public is predisposed to suspect the worst of its
government.”123  Observations by federal officials suggest strongly that both
Congress and the courts feel that each branch is unattuned to the other’s insti-
tutional challenges and needs.124  One suspects that a survey of state judges and
legislators would yield similar results.  Thus, when a judiciary promotes its own
autonomy within state government, it may foster an isolation that perpetuates
misunderstanding and forfeits opportunities to evoke the loyalty and apprecia-
tion of the other branches, which can benefit from judicial expertise.
In elaborating any framework for judicial-nonjudicial contacts, Professor
Geyh warns that “a key prudential constraint is that the judiciary [must] avoid
tactics and interactions that could damage the reputation that fuels its influ-
ence.”125  The trick is to find a way toward “the judiciary remaining a part of the
political fray while appearing to stay above it.”126  What I would suggest, fol-
lowing upon the work of Professors Geyh and Robert Katzmann, as well as the
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recommendations of the American Bar Association Commission on Separation
of Powers and Judicial Independence, is the creation of new institutions within
states that will foster increased dialogue between the judicial and nonjudicial
branches.
One of these institutions should seek to promote dialogue specifically on
judicial administration, practice, and procedure.127  Some state courts have gone
quite far in asserting their exclusive authority over such matters, often claiming
that such judicial autonomy is integral to judicial independence.128  However,
the failure to involve executive and legislative branch officials in an ongoing
and systematic discussion of these issues can run the risk of seeming indifferent
to their very serious public policy consequences—even to the point of arro-
gance.  It sacrifices possible opportunities to acquaint legislators and their staffs
with the realities of the judicial workload.  For these reasons, the states should
follow the ABA’s recommendation to Congress with regard to the federal
courts, namely, to consider establishing a permanent commission on the courts,
to comprise
representatives from all three branches of government, as well as representatives of
litigants and other groups with an interest in the . . . courts.  The Commission would
develop, on an ongoing basis, recommendations for [the legislature] concerning court
practice, procedure, administration, and the like, and evaluate legislative proposals af-
fecting the courts introduced by members of [the legislature].129
Based on Judge Kaye’s experience in New York, special consideration might be
given to emphasizing the role of former-legislators-turned-judges and judges-
turned-legislators, whose unique dual branch perspectives should be especially
important in pursuing the work of such a commission.
A second institution would seek to promote legislative-judicial communica-
tion on the subject of statutes.  Following up a suggestion offered by Justice
Ginsburg, among others, the Governance Institute, headed by Robert Katz-
mann, has initiated an experiment in improving congressional access to federal
judicial opinions bearing on statutory law.130  Of special interest are opinions
that discern statutory gaps, ambiguities, and probable errors of wording or
grammar.  Although such opinions do not obligate Congress to react, Professor
Katzmann found from extensive interviewing that relevant congressional com-
mittees were largely unaware that judicial opinions were finding problems with
particular statutes.131  The Governance Institute helped establish a system
through which the D.C. Circuit’s chief counsel would send complete judicial
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opinions, without elaboration, to the leaders of both parties in the House and
Senate, as well as the chairs and ranking minority members of the relevant
committees and key legal staff.132  Not only did this effort help to keep commit-
tees informed as to how the courts reacted to their work, but it apparently en-
couraged legislative counsel to evaluate systematically their roles in legislative
drafting.133  It is easy to imagine the creation of a similar conduit at the state
level, although any implication that the judges are seeking to change the sub-
stantive policies embodied in legislative enactments must be avoided.  The sole
function of the new mechanism should be to foster greater awareness within
the legislature of the technical issues the courts have faced with particular stat-
utes, thus inviting the legislature to address those issues it chooses and helping
to underscore the judiciary’s awareness that the framing of statutory policy is,
in the first instance, most certainly a legislative matter.
On the subject of statutes, there is yet another way—also noted by Profes-
sor Katzmann—for judges to underscore their accountability to the legislature
in the implementation of statutory law.  Courts should avoid adopting what has
come to be known as the Scalia view of statutory interpretation, namely, that
recourse to legislative history should be all-but-categorically avoided in the dis-
cernment of statutory meaning.134  Despite the theoretical arguments in favor of
such a position—chiefly, that a legislature votes for the statutory language, not
for its supporting documentation—it seems implausible that a court is more
likely to give a statute its intended effect if it utterly ignores the documentation
surrounding its enactment.  A judge who asserts he or she is “merely” giving a
statute its best reading based on its precise wording, interpreted against the
context of all other relevant statutes, hardly diminishes judicial discretion to
confer on a statute virtually whatever meaning the judge chooses.  The license
that textualist judges take with statutes is surely not lost on legislators who
struggle to negotiate the appropriate wording that will embody the legislature’s
intentions.135  Although the utility and persuasiveness of legislative history may
vary, one suspects that former Representative Robert Kastenmeier, who served
as ranking majority member on the House Judiciary Committee, expressed a
common sentiment when he characterized the Scalia approach as “an assault on
the integrity of the legislative process.”136  Judges owe it to their legislatures to
be understanding and respectful of the processes by which legislation is made
when they interpret the outcomes of those processes.
In many states, a natural institutional defensiveness may impede efforts to
generate enhanced dialogue between judges and legislatures.  But I would sus-
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pect there is a hidden culprit behind the failure to innovate—namely, judicial
elections.  Judicial elections have been widely criticized for their apparent ad-
verse impact on judicial independence.  Substantial evidence supports the
proposition that the method of selection significantly affects judicial behavior—
especially judicial willingness or unwillingness to uphold unpopular individual
interests, such as the interests of criminal defendants, when they clash with
those of the state.137  In recent years, both the reality and appearance of judicial
independence have been compromised further by the skyrocketing costs of ju-
dicial elections.138  The fact that judicial campaigns are typically financed by the
lawyers and interest groups who appear before the victors stands in obvious
tension with the goal of judicial impartiality.139
Less noticed is another defect of judicial elections that may be every bit as
dangerous for judicial independence.  From the point of view of interbranch
relations, judicial elections are a design mistake.  Governors and legislators
come to know judges not as distinguished public servants, but as fellow politi-
cians.  The judges’ stake in their fellow partisans’ political fortunes is distress-
ingly direct.  In states having partisan elections, judges must maintain their par-
tisan ties; presumably they need the support of powerful members in the
nonjudicial branches to secure either reelection or nomination to a higher
court.  Furthermore, judges risk competing with legislators and governors for
political contributions.  Because judges have an electoral mandate—a mandate
in the case of statewide courts that may even be less parochial than that of state
legislators—judicial elections invite judicial confusion as to the nature of their
role.  Judges who win statewide races might wonder, at least subconsciously,
why they should defer to the policy judgments of state senators and representa-
tives.  Elected legislators, for their part, are probably less likely to credit
elected judges as having any more public-interested an outlook than their own.
It is sometimes argued that judicial elections are justified because they lend
legitimacy and popular accountability to the courts.140  As the federal courts
demonstrate, however, elections are not a necessary precondition for judicial
legitimacy.  As for popular accountability, the low voter turnout in judicial elec-
tions and the thoroughly inadequate information available to virtually all voters
regarding judicial qualifications greatly diminish the democratic significance of
a judicial election.141  In Pennsylvania, the state constitution perversely ensures
this state of affairs by requiring that judicial elections occur at the same time as
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municipal elections, when voter interest is generally far lower than during
statewide and national races.142
Certainly, there is reason to doubt whether the elected courts’ connection to
the electorate enhances their legitimacy in the eyes of governors and legisla-
tors.  In 1996, an interbranch squabble erupted in Illinois when that state’s
elected Supreme Court declined the Attorney General’s request to promulgate
rules to implement a judicial bypass procedure that the Attorney General
deemed essential to preserving the constitutionality of a statute generally re-
quiring parental notification prior to a minor receiving an abortion.  Legislators
responded that the elected “jurists are arrogant and ‘have lost touch with the
views of the people of Illinois,’” and introduced proposals to redistrict Supreme
Court elections in the hope of producing a different philosophical composition
for the court.143  Perhaps ironically, one of the proposals to reform the “out-of-
touch” court would have divided the Supreme Court into civil and criminal di-
visions, with the civil division subject to merit selection.144
What judicial elections may accomplish most effectively is preventing either
the state legislature or the executive branch from claiming any “ownership”
over the composition of the courts.  If the courts function well, the nonjudicial
branches get no credit.  If they function poorly, they are not to blame.  Having
no role in populating the state’s judicial hierarchy, the state’s political leaders
may not feel obligated to facilitate the effective institutional operations of
those whom they did not choose.  One advantage of eliminating judicial elec-
tions might be to promote the idea that although the separate branches check
and balance one another, they also depend upon one another for the pursuit of
effective governance.
V
CONCLUSION
The decisional independence of state courts is of paramount importance to
the quality of justice that Americans enjoy.  The protection of that independ-
ence deserves the support of every lawyer—indeed, of every citizen.  It would
be both politically helpful to the cause and a sound reading of our history and
traditions to conceptualize judicial independence as a constitutional entitle-
ment in every state.  Even if every intrusion into that independence is not le-
gally actionable, we should recognize that efforts to intimidate or politicize the
judiciary threaten not merely an ideal, but an entitlement.
The quality of state judicial relations with governors and state legislators
will have an impact on the pursuit and protection of judicial independence.
Judges, like governors and legislators, should be careful to avoid unnecessary
interbranch clashes.  They should pursue their role within a value framework
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that attends to the appropriately constrained nature of judicial policymaking.
However, “restraint” should not be pursued as an overriding ideal for its own
sake.  Unless courts interpret the law fearlessly, and are seen to be doing so,
they will undermine the rationale for judicial independence.  The cases in which
greater restraint might seem most prudent are cases that seek to compel state
resources for the courts themselves.  The assertion of such powers, rather than
bolstering the judiciary’s institutional autonomy, actually may underscore the
courts’ political dependency.  It is best to pursue a court’s legislative agenda
through legislative means.
The quality of interbranch relations would help sustain judicial independ-
ence more effectively if state judges were not elected.  Appointive systems can
bolster the nonjudicial branches’ sense of responsibility for the institutional ef-
fectiveness of the courts, and foster interbranch relations that cast judges as
skilled, public-minded experts, rather than as citizens of the rough-and-tumble
political world.  Failing that, judges may help to elicit the understanding and
loyalty of other branches through new institutions that provide legislators and
executive officials with information useful to their respective functions, as well
as opportunities for input into the workings of the courts.
The current threats to federal judicial independence are not trivial, but it is
astonishing how well the federal courts have survived despite a two-century his-
tory of controversial decisionmaking.  Their success has rested in large measure
on the federal system for judicial appointments and on the federal courts’ self-
declared dependency on Congress for appropriations and jurisdiction, both of
which have fostered a spirit of mutual accountability.  There is a great deal of
difference, constitutionally speaking, between independence and isolation.  Ju-
dicial acceptance of mutual obligation may go further to protect the core of ju-
dicial independence than any other strategy.
